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Which Model of Lay Justice?
In die recent literature on lay magistrates it is possible to discern a number of competing models of lay jusdce, each of which is associated widi a rather different set of principles on which die practice of selecdng and recruidng magistrates could be said to be based, eidier now or in die past.
Lay magistrates as a 'social elite'
Historically magistrates were recruited almost exclusively from the ranks of the landed gentry (Skyrme 1983) , but even today one of the most enduring images of the lay magistracy is of a social elite that is still predominantly recruited from a very narrow and privileged segment of the community (Burney 1979; Raine 1989) . While apologists for the system are at pains to emphasize how far things have changed in recent years (Skyrme 1983: 8) , its critics draw attention to the hitherto arcane and highly personalized selection procedure which, because it is dominated by existing magistrates, is credited with the maintenance of 'self-perpetuating oligarchies' (Burney 1979: 73 ff.) . Much of die research that has been conducted in recent years confirms die accuracy of this assessment by drawing attention to the narrow social composition both of die Bench as a whole (Hood 1972; Baldwin 1976) , and also in respect of individual Benches (Burney 1979; King and May 1985; Raine 1989) . Even more remarkable was the extraordinarily exclusive social circle to which many members of one local Bench belonged, which was featured in another widely reported study (Bardett and Walker 1973, 1975) .
Lay magistrates as a 'meritocracy'
There are no formal qualifications for serving as a magistrate beyond a residential requirement prescribing diat a person must either reside in, or widiin 15 miles of die boundary of the commission (Bench) to which he or she is appointed. Nevertheless at an informal level die over-riding consideration in selecting and appointing new magistrates is said to be dieir 'personal suitability' for die appointment. This exceedingly vacuous principle was only slighdy amplified by an instruction issued by the Lord Chancellor in 1948, which referred to a candidate's 'character, integrity and understanding' (Lord Chancellor's Department 1948) . A more recent instruction 1 issued by the same source also speaks of die need for integrity, good character and repute, though it goes on to catalogue other qualities, including die ability to command die confidence of both public and colleagues, die capacity or potential to act judicially, and diereby make proper decisions, the ability to recognize and set aside personal prejudices, to understand what facts and arguments are relevant and to think clearly and logically. Reference is also made to die need for humanity, sensidvity and a capacity for working with colleagues and contributing to effective discussion by expressing views clearly and concisely. Odier requirements are said to include an appreciadon of die need for die rule of law, and both die dme and commitment needed in order to discharge die responsibilities of a magistrate. Finally, some experience, understanding or knowledge of Life outside die immediate circle of family and work is also said to be desirable.
However, in spite of the prominence diat is given to such personal qualides in die instructions for Advisory Committees diat are responsible for recommending appointments, very litde attempt is made publicly to defend die existing system of selecdon and appointment on die basis of personal merit Instead, official accounts of die magistracy are much more likely to portray lay magistrates either as representadves of die local community or even as being representative of the local community, at least in terms of its social composition.
Lay magistrates as a 'microcosm of the local community'
In his semi-official account of the lay magistracy, Skyrme states (1983: 67) that '[t] he declared policy of each Lord Chancellor since 1945 has been to make sure that each Bench is a microcosm of the local community in which it operates '. Earlier (1983: 61) he asserts that 'for many years Advisory Committees have been required ... to ensure that each Bench represents a social and occupational cross-section of the local community'. If taken literally, this ideal is clearly at odds with the reality depicted in the numerous research studies referred to above. However, despite the rhetoric, it appears that the real objective is a much more modest one and amounts to no more than 'seeing that in every petty sessional division there are at least some justices from each of the principal social and political groups in the area and that the Bench is not dominated by any one group' (Skyrme 1983: 61) . In reality the official policy was more accurately reflected in Lordjowitt's 1948 directive (also quoted by Skyrme) in which he stressed the importance, specifically in relation to political affiliations, that candidates should be 'drawn from all sections of the community so as to represent a cross-section of all shades of opinion and . . . that there should be no overweighting in favour of any one section'.
Other commentators (King and May 1985; Raine 1989) have also made the point that, far from seeking to achieve a Bench whose social composition proportionately reflects that of the area from which it is drawn, the primary aim appears to be a Bench that is broadly balanced (or at least one diat avoids the appearance of gross imbalance) in terms of its views-particularly in respect of its political allegiances-and ako in terms of the range of social backgrounds from which it is drawn. Nevertheless the image of a truly representative lay magistracy represents a dominant ideal, and one to which lip-service continues to be paid by supporters of the present system.
Lay magistrates as representatives of their local communities'
One of the attractions of the lay magistracy has always been its capacity (or at least its potential capacity) to ensure that local conditions may be reflected in the application of criminal justice. Or, as Lord Merrivale put it, '[t]he justice which matters most in the homes of the people is the justice administered by the magistrates in their midst'. More recently, the notion of'geographical spread' has been gaining prominence, the purpose of which is to prevent a concentration of magistrates from one or more districts within the commission catchment area (King and May 1985) . Burney suggests (1979: 79) that one reason for the growing support it is receiving from the Lord Chancellor and from ever more Advisory Committees is that such a policy might help to counter allegations of self-perpetuating social cliques, since these are given credence by the continuing tendency to accept nominations from existing magistrates. According to Skyrme (1983: 46) the same principle extends also to membership of the Advisory Committees themselves. However diere has been little attempt to date to investigate the extent to which this aspiration is achieved in practice.
The above models provide four 'standards' or 'ideals' against which the actual composition of local Benches may be measured. Other justifications for the lay magistracy have been advanced, but most of diese are either variants of the above, or represent 'meta objectives' to which one or other of the above models may be said to 186
aspire. This is an issue we will be returning to in our concluding section. Meanwhile, we will present the findings of our own detailed study of the composition of a local Bench in the north midlands of England, most of the fieldwork for which was undertaken in the late 1980s and early 1990s.
Study Findings: The Composition of the Whitechurch Bench
The petty sessional division of Whitechurch 2 is situated in the north-eastern part of the county of Redshire, and comprises the historic market town of Whitechurch itself, together with the surrounding rural area of Greendale and the heavily industrialized urban area of Blackthorpe. The catchment area from which the great majority of Whitechurch magistrates are recruited is reasonably diverse in terms of its social profile, unemployment rate and types of economic activity, and, as such, proved to be an interesting choice for die purpose of comparing the actual composition of the local Bench with the idealized models oudined above.
In 1991 there were 116 magistrates on die Active List for the Whitechurch petty sessional area. In terms of gender, women were under-represented, at just under 40 per cent of the total, which was also slighdy below the national proportion of women magistrates (45 per cent) at the time (Home Office 1992).
3 With regard to age, die Whitechurch figures (shown in Table 1 , below) are very much in line with those noted in an earlier study (Hood 1972) , which was based on fieldwork conducted in 1966-67. Thus, over 80 per cent of Whitechurch magistrates were aged 50 or more (compared with 75 per cent in Hood's study) and only 5 per cent were under 40. This suggests that in terms of age, magistrates in some parts of the country may be no more representative of the adult population at large dian they were a quarter of a century ago. Although there was only one magistrate of Asian origin on die Whitechurch Bench, this was broadly in line with the ethnic composition of Nordi East Redshire, where 99 per cent of the population is white.
Turning to die social structure of die Whitechurch Bench, traditionally diis has been measured exclusively in terms of occupational status, normally using the RegistrarGeneral's system of classification. Table 2 shows how die pattern for Whitechurch compares with diat disclosed by previous findings diat were obtained on die same basis. The proportion of wage-earning magistrates in Whitechurch is somewhat higher than in previous studies, and the proportion of employers and managers (Class E) appears to be substantially smaller, though the figures do nothing to dispel the overall picture of a magistracy that is still drawn predominantly from the middle classes. Certain professions, such as teachers and lecturers, appeared to be particularly well represented on the Whitechurch Bench, where they accounted for 8.5 per cent of male magistrates and no fewer than 21.7 per cent of female magistrates, though this is also in line with other studies (e.g. Raine 1989 ). The proportion of women with no occupation outside of the home (Class O) was very much larger in Whitechurch, and many of these (14) were described as 'voluntary workers'.
However, this system of classification has been described as a very inadequate yardstick for measuring social composition (Bumey 1979: 65) , and particularly the degree of working class representation on the Bench, since the traditional distinction between wage-earners and salaried staff has become increasingly blurred over the years. It not only lacks precision but is difficult to apply to those whose status may not be derived from their occupation, for example non-working partners and pensioners. Moreover, a somewhat different system of classification is used for census purposes, 4 which makes it very difficult to compare the social class background of particular Benches with that of the communities from which they are drawn.
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Another way of assessing social status is in terms of wealth and, although this is also fraught with difficulty, for the purposes of the present study an attempt was made to measure this with reference to residential property values. While not a perfecdy reliable measure of affluence, the rateable value of a person's domestic residence did at least provide a reasonably objective and easily applied indicator based on information that is (or was at the time the fieldwork was undertaken 6 ) readily available in the public domain. Rateable values were ascertained in respect of their normal place of residence for every magistrate residing in one of the three districts comprising the catchment area for the Whitechurch petty sessional division (Blackthorpe, Greendale and Whitechurch itself). The average rateable values for all magistrates' residences within that district were then compared with the average rateable value for all wholly domestic properties within the district as a whole. The data obtained from this analysis are summarized in Table 3 , below. It can be seen from this that the average rateable value of magistrates' domestic residences was appreciably higher than the district average in all three areas; and diat the more 'prosperous' the locality, the greater the differential between the two.
This differential between the average rateable value of magistrates' residences and the average for domestic properties as a whole can be seen even more clearly in Figures  1-3 below, which show how the profiles of average property values for magistrates compare with the averages for the districts in which diey reside. Once again this confirms that magistrates in Whitechurch tend to be drawn from the more affluent sectors of the communities they reside in, irrespective of the overall prosperity of those communities.
Apart from the social and demographic characteristics of the Bench, previous studies (for example Hood 1972; Burney 1979 and Raine 1989) have also drawn attention to magistrates' apparent social affiliations and declared political allegiances. One issue which has excited considerable interest is the restricted range of social organizations from which the membership of certain Benches appears to have been disproportionately recruited in some areas. In Bartlett and Walker's study (1973 and 1975) of the Rochdale Bench, for example, a very high proportion of magistrates (over 59 per cent) were either Freemasons or belonged to Rotary clubs (or the 'Inner Wheel' in the case of women magistrates). Many were members of other public bodies such as the local Health Executive Council or Hospital Management Committee, and, in many cases, belonged to more than one of these organizations. Such revelations helped to fuel allegations that the magistracy in many areas comprises a local self-selecting elite that is highly unrepresentative of the community from which it was drawn.
As far as the Whitechurch Bench is concerned, our survey of those on the Active List in 1989 disclosed that a total of 19 magistrates or their spouses (17 per cent of the total) were members of a Masonic Lodge or Rotary organization. This is very much lower Turning to political allegiances, there was a marked contrast between the declared voting intentions of the Whitechurch Bench and the pattern of voting in local council elections at the time, as can be seen from Table 4 , below. Thus, while the area comprising the petty sessional division returned a large majority of Labour councillors (70 per cent) only just over a quarter of magistrates expressed the intention of voting Labour.
7 Conversely, while almost half of Whitechurch's magistrates identified with die Conservatives the party locally had only 16 per cent of local council seats at the time. In political terms, therefore, the Whitechurch Bench was far from being a microcosm of the local community, and could be said to be balanced only in the very weak sense diat all die main political parties at the time had some representation at least on the Bench. As for the distribution of Whitechurch magistrates, all but nine (8 per cent) of the 113 who were on the 'Active List' for 1989 resided within the Petty Sessional Division itself. In order to assess the geographical spread of the latter across die division as a whole, the distribution of their residential addresses was plotted by electoral ward (see Fig. 4 ). This made it possible to determine whether certain local communities were better represented than odiers on die local Bench, and, indeed, whether there were any local communities that had no representation at all.
If magistrates had been evenly distributed diroughout the 70 wards within the Whitechurch division, as the principle of 'geographical spread' would seem to require as an ideal, each ward would have contained between one and two magistrates (1.5 per ward). In fact the distribution of magistrates was quite uneven, as can be seen from Fig. 4 . No fewer dian 27 wards had no resident magistrates, while just five wards contained 33 magistrates, which is almost a third of the total.
Next, die distribution of magistrates was compared with diat of councillors, in wards of different political complexions. Table 5 (below) shows diat, as might be expected, die number of councillors per 10,000 electors showed relatively litde variadon regardless of the polidcal affiliation of die ward as a whole. However, die concentration of magistrates was much greater in wards returning some, or all, non-Labour councillors than it was for those wards represented solely by Labour councillors. While diis differential held true for all diree of die main catchment areas for die Whitechurch Bench, it was particularly pronounced in die case of Greendale where die average number of magistrates residing in mixed or non-Labour areas was nearly twice as high as for Labour wards, and in Whitechurch itself, where it was more dian diree times as high. Indeed, the only wards in which die concentration of magistrates was greater dian that of councillors were non-Labour or mixed wards in Greendale and Whitechurch. In die latter the concentration of magistrates was twice diat of councillors, whereas in Labour-held wards (and also in non-Labour wards in Blackthorpe) die density of Number of magistrates in ward
F i c. 4 Distribution of magistrates by ward in which resident
10 magistrates was normally slightly over half that of councillors. As far as Whitechurch is concerned, therefore, the requirement of geographical spread is far from being satisfied, since just under 40 per cent of all wards have no resident magistrates while a handful of wards contain almost a third of magistrates. Moreover the requirement of political balance appears to be further undermined by the apparent inverse correlation that exists between magistrates' place of residence and the strengdi of Labour representation in each ward. Finally, an attempt was made to relate the distribution of magistrates on the 'Active List' to the 'social profiles' of the wards in which they reside, in order to determine which factor or combination of factors might best account for the pattern described above. The overall social composition for each ward was measured in terms of the following six indicators: (i) proportion of heads of households classified as professional and managerial workers The latter two are composite variables derived from the statistical manipulation (by factor analysis) of 35 selected indicators from the total 1981 census data set for the county of Redshire. The socio-economic status variable is heavily weighted by occupational status and car ownership (as an indicator of household income). It is also strongly correlated with housing tenure, unemployment and age. The social deprivation variable is heavily weighted by large families, crowded living conditions, one parent families, unemployment and population density. 
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1.000 Table 6 , above, shows the correlation coefficients obtained for the distribution of magistrates in relation to each of these social indicators. From diis it can be seen diat the factor which was most strongly correlated with die distribution of magistrates in the Whitechurch petty sessional division at the time of die survey was die proportion of die populadon widi higher educational qualifications, which had a moderately strong correctional co-efficient of 0.668. Moderate positive correlations were recorded for socio-economic status (SES = 0.519) and odier indicators of social status including professional or managerial occupational (HClass = 0.490) two-car ownership (0.419). Conversely, diere was a moderate negative correlation in respect of die proportion of semi-skilled and unskilled workers (LClass = -0.417). Deprivation on die other hand appears to be unrelated to die distribution of magistrates (and indeed all odier variables).
The significance of higher education as die most powerful variable in explaining die distribution of magistrates in Whitechurch was conGrmed when die data were subjected to multiple regression analysis which produced die best equation in relation to NMAGS (number of magistrates) and HEDUC (proportion of die local population widi higher educational qualifications), yielding a correlation coefficient of 0.705. Finally, a polynomial regression analysis was performed on die higher education variable which provided further confirmation of die seemingly strong relationship between diis variable and die actual distribution of magistrates. Fig. 5 shows die resulting scattergram widi a curved line indicating die least squares GL It can be seen from diis diat in areas where a low percentage of individuals have obtained higher educational qualifications diere are many wards with no magistrates, whereas in areas where a greater percentage of individuals have obtained higher education qualifications diere is a disproportionately greater number of magistrates dian might odierwise have been expected.
The scattergram in Fig. 5 also shows diat in 53 out of die 70 wards die percentage of die population widi higher educational qualifications was less dian 10 per cent. Since die total number of magistrates residing in such wards was 52, diis gives a mean of just under one magistrate per ward. Aldiough diere were only 17 wards in which die percentage of die population was more dian 10 per cent, diese wards in fact contained an equal number of magistrates (52), giving a mean of very nearly diree magistrates per ward.
Discussion and Implications: What Kind of Lay Justice?
In terms of the four models diat were described at the beginning of die paper, die present study confirms odier recent accounts of die magistracy in refuting claims that it represents a 'microcosm 1 of society, whedier in terms of its social composition, political allegiances or social affiliations. Not only is the Whitechurch Bench far from representative, still, of the local community from which it is drawn, the evidence we have presented suggests that large sectors of the population have no 'representation' whatever on the local Bench, while other localities are decidedly 'over-represented'. Although not as elitist as it once was, the uneven distribution of Whitechurch magistrates, together with the findings on residential property values, confirm how far there still is to go in order to dispel once and for all the enduring image of a self-perpetuating social clique. One of the most significant findings, however, was the apparently strong relationship between the distribution of Whitechurch magistrates and the proportion of people with higher educational qualifications in the areas within which they reside. Together with the continuing over-representation of professional groups on the Bench, and in particular that of lecturers and teachers, such findings are also consistent with a meritocratic model of lay justice.
In diis final section we wish to open up the debate on die social composition of the magistracy in the light of these findings. So far this debate has focused almost exclusively on the extent to which die composition of the magistracy satisfies, or fails to satisfy, die 'democracy test', or die much less rigorous requirement of 'balance'. This seems unsatisfactory, not only because of die degree of ambiguity and confusion surrounding die 'target' principle by which die existing composition of die Bench, and future changes to it, are supposed to be assessed, but also because it deflects attention away from a much more important set of questions relating to die kind of local justice diat is considered desirable. Only when we are clear about die underlying justification(s) for having a system of lay jusdce in die first place will it be possible to develop a radonal 195 and defensible recruitment policy and to devise the appropriate mechanisms and institutional arrangements for implementing it. Among the possible justifications for having a system of lay justice we would suggest that there are three main contenders. The first may be characterized as an argument in favour of a quasi-professional panel of suitably qualified people whose local knowledge might improve their fact-finding abilities while affording a humane, speedy and, above all, cheap form of localized justice. This would imply an avowedly meritocratic basis for recruitment, and would require much more careful thought to be given both to the kind of qualifications that would be desirable for aspiring magistrates and also the means of assessing these. The kind of recruitment policy that would be required for this purpose would do little to rebut the charge of social elitism, and might well raise awkward questions about the legitimacy of the Bench in the eyes of defendant and the local community alike. On die odier hand such a policy would at least be more honest than the present practice of professing to aspire to a more democratic or 'balanced' Bench while maintaining a covert and largely unarticulated meritocratic selection policy under die guise of 'personal suitability' requirements.
A second justification for maintaining a system of lay justice could be characterized as die 'judicial safeguard' argument, in which magistrates are seen as fulfilling one of die main functions of the jury system they have come to displace for die vast majority of criminal defendants. Here, it would be the fact that magistrates are not professionally trained as lawyers, but are ordinary people coming from all walks of life that would be important, since diey ought then to be better able to understand and show sensitivity towards die defendant's situation. In terms of recruitment and selection policy, diis rationale would arguably require a much greater commitment to the goal of 'democratizing' die Bench, to ensure diat it is at least reasonably representadve of die community from which it is drawn. However it would still need to be acknowledged diat however closely Benches might reflect die composition of die local community, diey would almost certainly be far from representative of die great majority of defendants appearing before diem, and might still tiierefore be expected to lack legitimacy in dieir eyes.
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A diird possible justification for a local lay magistracy might be dubbed die 'democratic safeguard' argument, according to which diere is merit in diffusing power into die hands of local representatives who might be expected to temper die application of a centralized system of justice widi regard to die rights and interests of die local community, including resident minority groups widiin die community. Arguably, diis would require magistrates to be representative, not only of die local community as a whole, but also of its constituent localities. The kind of selection and recruitment policy diat would be required in order to secure diis objective would need to be much more sensitive to die principle of 'geographical representation'. Indeed, taken to its logical conclusion diis might require magistrates to be appointed by, or at least on behalf of, diose over whom dieir jurisdiction extends (see also Raine 1989: 172) .
The analysis we have presented confirms earlier findings diat in reality die lay magistracy falls far short of any of die ideals professed by its supporters, and under die current arrangements for selection and recruitment it is difficult to see how this might change. One of the main problems is that at present there is no clear agreement as to which of the competing purposes the existing system is primarily intended to serve, and until this fundamental question is addressed the prospects for reforming the composition of the magistracy seem as remote as ever.
